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TAKING SUBROGATION SERIOUSLY:
THE BLUE CROSS-BLUE SHIELD TOBACCO
LITIGATION RECONSIDERED*
Mark C. Webert
INTRODUCTION
On June 4, 2001, a jury in the Eastern District of New
York awarded Empire Blue Cross-Blue Shield $17.8 million
against six tobacco company defendants for violating New York
consumer protection laws and committing unfair and deceptive
business practices.' Although state governments achieved a
* ©2001 Mark C. Weber. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A. Columbia; J.D. Yale. I thank
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Stephan Landsman, and Joseph Borders for their comments on the
manuscript. Special thanks to Catherine Tetzlaff for her research assistance. By way of
disclosure, let me note that I am insured under a Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan, and do
not smoke.
I Alan Feuer, Tobacco Jury Awards Insurer, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2001, at A22;
see Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV 3287 (JBW), 2001
WL 1304370 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Empire]. Though noteworthy, the
award was lower than might have been anticipated in light of the finding of liability.
The jury rejected the conclusion that the tobacco companies had engaged in fraud or
racketeering, and so did not award punitive damages. The absence of a racketeering
finding foreclosed a treble damages award under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO'), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994). Empire prevailed on the
claims that the companies violated New York consumer protection laws and engaged m
unfair and deceptive business practices. Media Backgrounder: Brooklyn Jury Shatters
Big Tobacco's Winning Streak, Tobacco Products Liability Project, at
http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/PRlBackgrounders/empire-.htm (last visited June 4, 2001).
The relatively modest amount awarded, especially on the subrogation claim, supports
the conclusion that even successful individual claims by smokers are not necessarily
big money cases, and may need to be pooled in some fashion in order to justify the high
litigation expenses they entail. See Mark C. Weber, Thanks for Not Suing: The
Prospects for State Court Class Action Litigation Over Tobacco Injuries, 33 GA. L. REV.
979, 1009-10 (1999) (discussing need to pool expenses in light of reductions to recovery
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$246 billion settlement against tobacco producers in 1998 for
tobacco-related Medicaid expenditures, 2 the Empire case
represented the first time a third party medical expense payor
case actually went to verdict.3 The result was thus very big
news for the federal courts of the Second Circuit and for the
judicial system of the United States.
In the Eastern District action, twenty-one Blue Cross-
Blue Shield plans asserted both direct injury and subrogation
claims against the tobacco compames. Empire, whose case
came to trial first, received alternative awards of $17.8 million
for direct injury and $11.8 million as subrogee of the injury
claims that could be brought by its members. 4
The direct injury and subrogation claims merit separate
treatment. Direct injury claims have fared poorly on appeal. So
far, the Umted States courts of appeals, including the Second
Circuit, have uniformly rejected direct injury claims of third
party payors.5 Judge Jack Weinstein, who presided over the
Empire trial and entered judgment, allowed the case to proceed
on the direct injury theory, noting distinctions from the Second
Circuit case that had failed.6 While the third party payors'
claims of direct injury have some persuasive power, anyone
playing the odds would conclude that the $17.8 million verdict
based on that injury will have rough sailing in the Second
Circuit. Still more doubtful would be the fate of any similar
verdict based on a violation of RICO,7 the specific cause of
action that the courts of appeals have most frequently rejected,
due to comparative fault); see also infra text accompanying notes 96-99 (discussing
pooling effect of insurer lawsuits).
2 National Association of Attorneys General Tobacco Documents Master
Settlement Agreement, (Nov. 23, 1998), available at http://www.naag.org/tobacco-
public.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2001).
3 See Christopher Mumma, Tobacco Companies Ordered to Pay $17.8 Ailn
to Insurer, Bloomberg News Archive, at http://www.bloomberg.com/fgc...arkets-
quote99_news.ht&s (last visited June 4, 2001) ('rhe decision is the first instance in
which an insurer-a so-called third party-has succeeded in a court case seeking
reimbursement from the tobacco industry.").
4 See td.
5 See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Employers Health & Welfare
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 223 F.3d 1271, 1273-74 (l1th Cir. 2000) (rejecting state law
claims); see also cases cited infra note 9 (rejecting direct injury claims brought under
federal statutory causes of action).
6 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 113 F Supp. 2d
345, 371-72 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). See also infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
7 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
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and one that Empire had hoped to prevail upon at trial.8 The
courts of appeals that have ruled on the question have all
found third party payors' claims of direct injury from tobacco
too remote to satisfy the test for RICO liability 9
The courts of appeals have said nothing about the
subrogation claims,10 however, and for that reason their merits
remain very much an open question. Although they were
evidently the second choice of the insurer litigants, the modest
success of the Empire action, contrasted with the abject failure
of most direct injury cases, suggests that they will become the
favorite approach in the future.
8 See Mumma, supra note 3 (reporting interview with lawyer for Empire).
9 Regence Blue Shield v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-35203, 2001 WL
205996, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2001) (unpublished op., citation disfavored); Serv.
Employees Inel Umon Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d 1068,
1076 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Ass'n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 241 F.3d
696, 703 (9th Cir. 2001); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 444
(3d Cir. 2000); Texas Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d
788, 789 (5th Cir. 2000); Inel Bd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Int'l Bd. of
Teamsters]; Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d
229, 244 (2d Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Laborers Local 171; Oregon Laborers-Employers
Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 F 3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter Oregon Laborers], cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1075 (2000); Steamfitters Local
Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 932 (3d Cir. 1999),
cert. dented, 528 U.S. 1105 (2000) [hereinafter Steamfitters Local Union].
The courts have rejected treble damages antitrust law claims on similar
grounds. Regence Blue Shield, Inc., 2001 WL 205996, at *1; Ass'n of Wash. Pub. Hosp.
Dists., 241 F.3d at 703; Service Employees Int'l Union, 249 F.3d at 1076; Allegheny
Gen. Hosp., 228 F.3d at 443; Tex. Carpenters, 199 F.3d at 443; Int'l Bd. of Teamsters,
196 F.3d at 823; Oregon Laborers, 185 F.3d at 966; Steamfitters Local Union No. 420,
171 F.3d at 933. Some of the cases also included state law claims, which the courts
rejected. See, e.g., Ass'n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists., 241 F.3d at 706; see also
Steamfitters Local Umon No. 614 Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Moms, Inc., No. W
1999-01061-COA-R9-CV, 2000 WL 1390171 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2000) (rejecting
various state law claims). But see Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 621
N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 2001) (answering certified questions regarding state claims so as to
permit claims to proceed).
1o See authority cited supra note 9. One court of appeals has found the claims
of a multi-employer benefits trust preempted by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA"). Lyons v. Philip Morris, Inc., 225 F.3d 909, 912-14 (8th Cir.
2000). This holding did not dispose of the merits of any subrogation claim that might
be brought pursuant to ERISA or some mixture of ERISA and other federal law (such
as RICO), and is in any instance not relevant to the claims of the Blue Cross plans. See
tnfra text accompanying notes 76-80 (discussing Lyons).
2001]
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
On a societal, rather than a tactical level, the important
fact about the subrogation claims is that individual litigation
has only occasionally been able to achieve compensation for
smoking injuries.1 Individual litigants encounter difficulties
establishing liability or they run out of money to support
litigation long before the case reaches a decision on the merits.
Aggregate tobacco litigation of one form or another is far more
likely to have a social impact than individual litigation, at least
in the near future. 12 Subrogation actions are an important
means for challenging tobacco on an aggregate basis. The
aggregate harm is clear: Smoking kills 400,000 Americans a
year, the equivalent of three jumbo jet crashes a day 13
Documents from the tobacco companies themselves provide
strong evidence of careless-and worse-conduct in the
manufacture and marketing of tobacco. 14 There has been no
adequate legislative response to compensate for and deter the
losses from smoking, or to achieve corrective justice for wrongs
inflicted. It remains to be seen if the tort system will provide a
means to rebalance the scales and relieve the victims and the
public of some of the costs. Subrogation actions could be the
way in which that relief occurs.
Although much has been written about the state
attorney generals' third party Medicaid payor actions against
the tobacco companies, 15 so far there has been little scholarship
concerning the private third party payors and their notable
lack of success in asserting direct injury claims.16 This Article
does not address that issue as such, but instead seeks to
answer the question of "what if." Assuming the direct injury
actions fail, what if the plaintiffs proceed on a subrogation
claim? Insurance subrogation in general has been the subject of
sporadic academic mquiry,17 but scholars have not yet had to
11 See tnfra text accompanying notes 98-99.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 97-99 (describing tobacco industry's fear
of aggregate litigation rather than individual cases).
13 See Weber, supra note 1, at 980 (collecting sources).
14 See infra note 68 and accompanying text (listing documentary sources).
15 See infra note 24 and accompanying text (listing illustrative sources).
16 A noteworthy student contribution on the topic is Stasia Mosesso, Note, Up
in Smoke: How the Proximate Cause Battle Extinguished the Tobacco War, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 257 (2000).
17 See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE,
LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 153-55 (1986) (discussing economic principles
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focus on the issue as it relates to third party payors' claims for
the costs of tobacco injuries.
This Article addresses that issue by discussing, in Part
I, the prospects for a tobacco subrogation claim for treble
damages relief under RICO Part II explores the analogous
action under state law Finally, Part III discusses questions
regarding the presentation of the subrogation claim to the trial
court and adjudication of thorny issues such as contributory
fault and reliance. The Article concludes that insurer
subrogation actions are a viable-perhaps the most viable-
means of achieving aggregated liability for the harms caused
by smoking.
I. INSURERS' RICO SUBROGATION CLAIMS FOR TOBACCO
INJURIES
Subrogation claims differ from the claims of direct
injury that the Blue Cross plans have pursued most
aggressively in their actions against the tobacco compames,
but like those claims, the subrogation actions are being
asserted under RICO as treble-damages cases. An analysis of
the leading RICO precedent demonstrates, perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, that the subrogation claims of the insurers fit
comfortably within the proximate cause standards established
by the statute. Other issues may still limit the applicability
and operation of the RICO treble-damages provision, however.
A. Subrogation Versus Direct Injury
"[S]ubrogation is an equitable right whereby a
nonvolunteer who has made a payment to another of a debt for
which he or she is only secondarily liable succeeds to that
party's rights against the third party who is primarily
regarding subrogation); RONALD C. HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1964); JEFFREY W STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES §§
11.01-.05 (2d ed. 1999 and Supp. 2001); June F Entman, More Reasons for Abolishing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a): The Problem of the Proper Plaintiff and
Insurance Subrogation, 68 N.C. L. REV. 893 (1990); Jeffiey W Stempel, Recent Case
Developments, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 207, 233-37 (1999-2000) (discussing subrogation
dispute).
20011
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responsible for the debt."'18 In the context of Blue Cross-Blue
Shield insurance claims against Big Tobacco, the insurance
companies paid the smokers' medical bills. Thus the insurers
succeed to the smokers' rights against the tobacco companies,
whose wrongful conduct supposedly caused the losses. Since
nearly all health insurance policies contain subrogation
clauses, 19 the claim is one of conventional, rather than
equitable, subrogation.20
A subrogation claim differs from the direct injury claims
asserted by the Blue Cross plans and other insurers against
Big Tobacco. In claiming direct injury to themselves, the
insurers allege that they expended their funds to treat tobacco
victims, and would not have done so but for the wrongful
conduct of the tobacco companies in manufacturing and
marketing their harmful products. The loss is thus to the
surplus (or other competing expenditures) of the nonprofit
plans.21 The insurers have argued further that if they
themselves had not been the target of fraudulent
misrepresentations, they would have done more to dimimsh
smoking among their insureds, and thus would not have
suffered losses as great as they did.22 These claims are not the
same as the claim that the tobacco companies injured
consumers by selling them cigarettes that caused cancer, and
that the consumers contractually or equitably assigned (i.e.,
subrogated) their causes of action for their losses to the entities
that paid for treatment.23 The attraction of direct injury
18 ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 96(b), at 603 (2d
ed. 1996).
19 Id. § 96(c), at 605 ("Iinsurers now routinely include subrogation clauses in
health insurance contracts.").
20 See id. at 602 C' 'Conventional subrogation' arises out of the
contractual relationship of the parties."); STEMPEL, supra note 17, at § 11.02
(suggesting use of "contracted" rather than "conventional" for subrogation by contract);
see also Health Care Serv. Corp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 208 F.3d 579,
581 (7th Cir. 2000) ('Doubtless the Blues are subrogated to their insureds' tort
claims.").
21 See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 36 F Supp. 2d
560, 569-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (describing direct injury claim).
22 See, e.g., Oregon Laborers, 185 F.3d at 962; see also Laborers Local 17, 191
F.3d at 233 (describing claimed losses "due to the Funds' inability to control costs, to
promote the use of safer alternative products, and to establish programs to educate
their participants not to use tobacco products").23 As the Third Circuit explained:
In plaintiffs' submission, notwithstanding defendants' argument that
[Vol. 67- 2
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theories is their ability to avoid the obstacles facing the
smokers' causes of action for negligence, product liability, and
fraud.24 Smokers' negligence and product liability actions
present, at minimum, difficulties with comparative fault and,
to the extent they are based on failure to warn, preemption by
federal law 25 Fraud actions typically require a showing of
reliance. 26
all of the Funds' claims are essentially subrogation claims, their
"direct" claim is a fundamentally different legal claim from the typical
insurer-against-wrongdoer claim that falls under the principle of
subrogation. This direct claim is said to arise not only out of a
tortfeasor's actions toward an insured, but also from its actions toward
the insurance company (here the Funds) itself. The traditional
subrogation principle holds that an "insurer, upon paying to the
assured the amount of a loss of the property insured, is doubtless
subrogated in a corresponding amount to the assured's right of action
against any other person responsible for the loss." Great Am. Ins. Co.,
575 F.2d at 1034 (quoting W VANCE, VANCE ON INSURANCE 787 n.2 (3d
ed. 1951)). Here, the Funds are essentially claiming that they paid for
more than "the property insured" (i.e., the health of fund participants)
because the defendants caused the Funds to expend additional costs
that would have been paid by the tobacco companies (through reduced
revenues and tort damages) if they had not defrauded the Funds and
conspired to cover up their wrongdoing.
Steamfitters Local Union, 171 F.3d at 920.
24 See Richard A. Epstein, Subrogation and Insurance, with Especial Reference
to the Tobacco Litigation, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 493, 499 (1997) (discussing state
government litigation over Medicaid expenditures and assumption of risk defense). The
efforts of the states to recover the Medicaid costs free of the defenses sparked
considerable controversy. See, e.g., td; Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation:
Snuffing Out the Rule of Law, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 601 (1998); Michael Moore, Tobacco
Litigation: A Problem that Needs a Solution, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 487 (1997); Wendy
E. Wagner, Rough Justice and the Attorney General Litigation, 33 GA. L. REv. 935
(1999). See generally Agency for Health Care Admm. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., 678
So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996) (ruling that creation of new cause of action free of traditional
defenses did not on its face violate due process). This Article sidesteps that debate and
assumes that whatever the law may be with regard to state Medicaid costs, Blue Cross
subrogation claims will remain subject to defenses applicable to the smokers' own
claims.
25 Federal law preempts claims based on the inadequacy of warnings on
cigarette packages for periods of time after the passage of federal warning
requirements. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992). Failure-to-
warn claims based on inadequacy of communications other than the package labels
may remain viable. See Michael D. Green, Cipollone Revisited. A Not So Little Secret
About the Scope of Cigarette Preemption, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1257 (1997) (noting that
Cipollone requires preemption only of claims based on inadequacy of package
warnings).
26 See, e.g., Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2 (Minn.
2001) (noting that reliance must be proven in statutory sales misrepresentation action,
but permitting use of circumstantial evidence).
20011
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Subrogation claims brought by insurers derive from the
smokers' rights to sue, and face the same impediments-
comparative fault, preemption, reliance-that the smokers'
actions do. Although the conventional subrogation that
originates in a contractual term of the insurance policy avoids
equitable defenses such as unclean hands,27 it remains subject
to legal defenses such as comparative fault.28 If an insurer can
show a direct injury to itself, the relevant question would be
whether it was guilty of comparative fault, and the insurers
are far more confident of a negative answer on that question
than smokers would be.
Nevertheless, the appeals courts have rejected insurers'
direct injury claims altogether, something they have not done
with the subrogated causes of action. For example, in Laborers
Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,29 the
Second Circuit ruled that all the harms that the insurers
suffered on account of the tobacco companies' conduct were
"entirely derivative of' and "purely contingent on" the harms
worked on the smokers themselves. 30 Thus the insurers' direct
harms, however real, were not proximate enough to support a
claim under RICO and other theories of liability 81
Judge Weinstein distinguished Laborers Local 17,
which arose out of a Southern District of New York multi-
employer benefits trust action, primarily on the ground that
the Blue Cross plans have such a huge role in the health care
industry that they are a different class of victim than an
individual union local benefits trust.32 Although the Seventh
27 See JERRY, supra note 18, at § 96(b), 603.
28 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Town of Ville Platte, 269 So. 2d 298, 304 (La.
Ct. App. 1972) (barring subrogation claim on account of insured's contributory
negligence); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Dow Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 97,
100 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) ("Since the Joneses are subject to the defense of contributory
negligence, so is Prudential.").
29 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999).
3 0 Id. at 239.
31 See td. at 244. Other courts have questioned whether such losses are even
real, noting that the insurers had the capacity to pass them through to ratepayers. See
Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 196 F.3d at 824. For Judge Weinstein's response to this
argument, see Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, 36 F Supp. 2d at 569-
70 (noting that many businesses have the ability to shift losses to consumers but may
recover for wrongful conduct anyway).
32 Nat'l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 74 F Supp. 2d 213,
216-217 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); accord Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, 113
[Vol. 67" 2
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Circuit was guilty of rhetorical overkill in describing Judge
Wemstei's opinion as "a thinly disguised refusal to accept and
follow the second circuit's holding,"33 the distinction has
obviously failed to persuade the other circuits that have passed
on Blue Shield plans' direct injury causes of action. If Empire's
direct injury claim fails on appeal, as the other direct injury
claims have, the subrogation claim is all that remains. Despite
its problems, it is the insurers' surest hope, and it may well
succeed.
B. Subrogatuon Under RICO
There is no barrier to a subrogee filing suit for treble
damages under RICO's general principles, and the leading case
from the Supreme Court assumes arguendo that an insurer
whose subrogor has received an injury actionable under RICO
may sue for the relief.3 4 A further analysis of the case shows
that although remoteness bars a treble-damages claim,
subrogation does not bear on the remoteness question.
F. Supp. 2d at 371-72. Presumably, the argument is that this prominent role removes
the Blue Cross plans from the "unexpected victim" limit on proximate causation. See,
e.g., MARc A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 419 (7th ed.
2001) (describing limits on proxmnate cause pertaining to "unexpected victim"); see also
Natil Asbestos Workers v. Philip Morris, 74 F. Supp. 2d 221, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
("Injury to the Blues was allegedly more foreseeable, and allegedly more calculated as
part of the defendants' racketeering scheme, because of the Blues' dominant and highly
visible role as health care providers throughout the nation."). This argument has some
persuasive power, given the strong relevance of foreseeability to proximate cause, and
the likely congressional knowledge of that fact when it passed RICO. See Holmes v.
Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (applying traditional proximate cause
analysis to interpret causation requirement in RICO)
33 Int7 Bd. of Teamsters, 196 F.3d at 827.
34 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271; see also Ramos v. Patrician Equities Corp.,
No. 89CIV5370 (TPG), 1993 WL 58428 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1993) (allowing surety to
assert RICO claims of investors); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Ayers, 760 F Supp. 1118, 1119-20
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (allowing subrogated surety to assert RICO for treble damages); Sec.
Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Poiner, 653 F. Supp. 63, 65-66 (D. Or. 1986) (finding insurer to have
standing under RICO); Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md.,
598 F Supp. 1223, 1246 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that blanket bond issuer's third-party
complaint sufficiently pled RICO counts).
2001]
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1. RICO Principles
RICO establishes a claim for treble damages for "[a]ny
person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of'35 any of a list of prohibited activities,8 6 including
engaging in a pattern of mail fraud or wire fraud,8 7 threatening
and intimidating witnesses,38 and interstate and foreign travel
in aid of racketeering.3 9 The Blue Cross plans allege that the
tobacco compames have committed those crnmes in the course
of making and selling cigarettes and other products. 40
RICO's cause of action extends to all specified violations
of the law; there is no need for the activity to rise to the level of
orgamzed crime. As the Supreme Court has commented:
The occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to combat
orgamzed crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a
more general statute, one which, although it had orgamzed crime as
its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime. In [the
statute], Congress picked out as key to RICO's application broad
concepts that might fairly indicate an orgamzed crime connection,
but that it fully realized do not either individually or together
provide anything approaching a perfect fit with "orgamzed crime."41
If the tobacco compames' alleged misrepresentations and
fraudulent concealment with regard to the dangers of smoking
and the addictive character of mcotine constitute a pattern of
violation of the underlying criminal code provisions, anyone
injured in his or her business or property may assert the treble
damages claim under RICO
35 18 U.S.C.A § 1964(c) (West 2000).
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
37 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1994).
38 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1513 (1994).
39 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
40 See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, 36 F Supp. 2d 560,
565-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
41 H.J., Inc. v. N.W Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989); see also Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) ("[There is] no distinct 'racketeering
injury' requirement If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in
a manner forbidden by these provisions, and the racketeering activities injure the
plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c).").
[Vol. 67- 2
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Or perhaps not quite anyone. As developed more fully
below, the Supreme Court has interpreted the causation idea
in "injured" to mean proximate causation, rather than cause in
fact.42 Therefore, the treble-damages plaintiff must show that
the relationship between the injurious conduct and the injury
is sufficiently direct.48 A similar test applies in antitrust
cases.44 Indeed, the Court adopted the proximate-cause
interpretation of the RICO claim on the strength of the analogy
to previous interpretations of comparable language in the
treble damages provision of the federal antitrust laws.45
2. Holmes v. SIPC
Apart from the problem of the defenses applicable to the
subrogated claims of the insured, a likely reason that the Blue
Cross plans have shied away from the subrogation cause of
action is the subrogee's defeat in the Supreme Court's one
seemingly analogous RICO subrogation case. In Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protectin Corp.,46 defendant Holmes
allegedly engaged in fraudulent manipulation of stock prices
that kept two broker-dealers from meeting obligations to
customers, forcing the liquidation of the brokerages and the
payout of insurance funds to their customers by the plaintiff,
the federally created corporation that protects customers in the
event of brokerage iquidations.47 The Securities Investment
Protection Corporation ("SIPC") asserted that Holmes was
liable to it for treble damages under RICO because the stock
manipulation entailed a pattern of violation of the securities
fraud laws that bankrupted the brokerages and thus harmed
the customers, even though the customers had not invested in
the manipulated stock. 8 Since the SIPC paid out to the
customers, it stood as subrogee for their claims. 49
42 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
43 See td. (discussing requirement of "some direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.").
44 Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 534 (1983).
45 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267-68.
46 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
47 Id. at 262-63.
48 Id. at 263-64.
49 Id. at 270-71.
2001]
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The Court rejected the corporation's claim. It held that
the RICO treble damages provision requires not just that the
defendant's pattern of racketeering activity be the cause in fact
of the plaintiffs losses; the conduct must also be the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs losses.5 0 The injury was insufficiently
direct to constitute proximate cause. The causal chain
depended on the stock mampulator causing harm to the
brokers, and, as a result, the brokers becoming insolvent. As
the Court stated, "[O]nly that intervening insolvency connects
the conspirators' acts to the losses suffered by the
nonpurchasing customers and general creditors."51 The Court
quoted the principle that "[t]he general tendency of the law, in
regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step,"52
and advanced policy reasons for not doing so in Holmes. First,
it would be difficult to sort out the role of the stock
mampulation, as opposed to poor business practices or other
causes, for the brokerages' insolvencies. Second, the broker-
dealers and the customers would have conflicting claims for
treble damages that would somehow need to be apportioned.
Third, the broker-dealers' own treble-damages suit would fully
vindicate the underlying law's purposes. 58
C. Insurers' Subrogatwn Claims for Tobacco Injunes
Under RICO
Once one plots out the nature of the relationship of the
parties and intermediaries in Holmes, it becomes obvious that
it is not analogous to the Blue Cross subrogation cases. In
contrast to the Holmes causal chain:
Defendant Racketeer (Holmes) -> Brokerages -> Customers -> SIPC,
the tobacco causal chain is:
Defendant Racketeer (Tobacco Co.) -> Smokers -> Blue Cross.
5 0 Id. at 268.
51 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271.
52 Id. (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533
(1918) (Holmes, J.)).
5 3 Id. at 272-73.
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The intermediate step, the one that gave the Court pause in
Holmes, is missing in tobacco. That distinction is crucial. The
Court in Holmes declared that "the link is too remote between
the stock mampulation alleged and the customers' harm,"54 not
the insurer's harm. Instead, it was willing to assume,
arguendo, that the insurer had the perfect right to stand in the
shoes of nonpurchasing customers. 55  Those customers,
however, had no claim under the statute. There is no obstacle
to a subrogee suing under RICO, but its subrogor must actually
have a cause of action under the law The Court held "not that
RICO cannot serve to right the conspirators' wrongs, but
merely that the nonpurchasing customers, or SIPC in their
stead, are not proper plaintiffs. '5 6 Just as the dealers, who
were directly harmed, had a claim under RICO,57 so too the
smokers in the tobacco case will have a claim if they can show
the underlying violations of the law And if they do, their
subrogees, the Blue Cross plans, can assert the claim under
ordinary subrogation doctrine.
D. Additinal Issues Regarding the Treble Damages
Provison
One additional limit on statutory reach must be noted
in discussing RICO subrogation claims for tobacco injuries.
Personal injuries are not within the treble damages provision.58
54Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
55Id.56 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 274. A district court case also involving subrogated
claims asserted under RICO reinforces the irrelevance of the subrogation to the
directness of the injury. Kaiser v. Stewart, 965 F Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1997). As in
Holmes, the plaintiff failed because the subrogors, in this instance, creditors of
bankrupt insurance compames, lacked a sufficiently direct injury to sustain a cause of
action under RICO. Kaiser, 965 F. Supp. at 689.
57 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 273-74 ("[Tihe broker-dealers have in fact sued in this
case, m the persons of their SIPA [Securities Investor Protection Act] trustees
appointed on account of their insolvency. Indeed, the insolvency of the victim directly
injured adds a farther concern to those already expressed, since a suit by an indirectly
injured victim could be an attempt to circumvent the relative priority its claim would
have in the directly injured victim's liquidation proceedings.").
58 See, e.g., Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918 (3d Cir. 1991);
Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1299-1300 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that neither
personal injury nor mental suffering are injury to business or property as defined by
RICO); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 509 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (stating that RICO does not provide treble damages for personal injury
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Rather, the damages are available only for injuries to "business
or property" 59 Therefore, the damages to be trebled in the
RICO subrogation action are the non-personal injury losses of
the smokers. Whether the hospitalization and medical costs,
particularly those traceable to fraud or misrepresentation,
constitute property losses rather than personal injuries is a
RICO-interpretation issue that is beyond the scope of this
Article.60
The disposition of the remedy is a final issue to be
considered. Although the general rule is that a subrogee may
sue only for the amount that it has paid out to the insured,
when a statute confers the right to punitive remedies, the
subrogee may assert the claim the statute provides. 61 The
amount in excess of the actual expenditures may need to be
held in trust for the person actually injured, however.62 It is a
matter of RICO interpretation whether the goals of the statute
are best served by allocation of the amount of damages in
excess of the actual insurer losses to the victims of tobacco-
related illnesses.
claims); cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (finding personal injury
claims to be outside scope of antitrust treble damages provision). For Judge
Weinstein's effort to distinguish some of these cases and explain his disagreement with
others, see Natl Asbestos Workers v. Philip Morris, 74 F Supp. 2d 221, 229-38
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) and Nat'l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 74 F
Supp. 2d 213, 218-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
59 18 U.S.C.A § 1964(c) (West 2000).
60 In one analogous case, a court permitted a claim under civil RICO for the
costs of defective cardiac pacemakers and the charges for implanting and removing
them, though not for personal injuries as such. In re Cordis Corp. Pacemaker Prod.
I.aab. Litig., No. MDL850, 1992 WL 754061, at *3 (S.D. Olo Dec. 23, 1992); see also
Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 196 F.3d at 823 ('[G]etting a product that causes deferred injury
and medical expenses, causes a loss of one's money, which is 'property.' ").
61 See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Brookwood Med. Ctr., 689 So. 2d 47, 50 (Ala. 1997)
(permitting action pursuant to statute by employer's workers' compensation carrier for
punitive award for worker's death). But see Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Bradley,
No. CV 940544726, 1997 WL 804898, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 1997) (rejecting
subrogee's claim for double and treble damages pursuant to statute).
62 See Cincinnati Ins. Co., 689 So. 2d at 50 (quoting statute). Determining
whether the same result would obtain under RICO requires an analysis of RICO's
statutory purposes that is beyond the scope of this article.
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II. INSURERS' SUBROGATION CLAIMS FOR TOBACCO
INJURIES UNDER STATE LAW
If the RICO subrogation claim fails on account of the
personal injury exclusion or some other basis, a claim still
remains under state law, under either consumer fraud statutes
or common law fraud, negligence, or product liability State law
grounded the $11.8 million alternative verdict in the Empire
case. Matters of remedies and of federal jurisdiction come into
play in discussing state law subrogation claims for tobacco
injuries.
A. Remedies in Common Law Tobacco Subrogation Actions
Unless the state has the equivalent of RICO remedies
under its own statutes, 63 the insurer must forgo.treble damages
and attorneys' fees. Punitive damages may also be beyond
reach, for the general rule is that a subrogee may recover only
its actual expenditures on behalf of the subrogor, not a punitive
award that exceeds the outlays.64 Nevertheless, state supreme
courts may determine that the policies of their states justify
departure from the rule, just as a statutory right to recovery in
a given jurisdiction might support punitive awards. 65
If punitive damages are available to the subrogee,
apportionment problems arise. Should the insurer have to give
the punitive award to the insured? The traditional rule is that
if a subrogee somehow receives damages greater than the
amount it paid, the amount goes to the subrogor (minus
reasonable litigation expenses, if applicable). 66 If a state
63 A number of states have their own versions of RICO. See, e.g., ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2314.04 (West Supp. 2O00);N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-05 (1997).
64 Wasko v. Manella, No. CV 930308152S, 2000 WL 1683417, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2000); S. Ry. Co. v. Malone Freight Lanes, Inc., 330 S.E.2d 371, 408-
09 (Ga. App. 1985); Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Culligan Fyrprotexion, Inc.,
437 N.E.2d 1360, 1371 (Ind. App. 1982); Colomal Penn Ins. Co. v. Ford, 411 A.2d 736,
737 (N.J. Super. 1979); Natl Umon Fire Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 955 S.W.2d 120,
133 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).6 5 See Cincinnati Ins. Co., 689 So. 2d at 50.
66 See JERRY, supra note 18, § 96(d), at 609 (collecting cases); see also ROBERT
E. KEETON, INsURANcE LAW 160-61 (1971) (supporting approach). See generally Jay S.
Bybee, Comment, Profit in Subrogation: An Insurer's Claim to Be More than
Indemnified, 1979 BYU L. REV. 145 (discussing apportionment of overage).
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chooses to depart from that rule and allows the insurer to keep
some of the punitive damages, how much should the insurer
keep' A Blue Cross plan typically pays the doctor and hospital
bills only in part, leaving a deductible and co-payment that the
insured must absorb, and it pays nothing for pain and suffering
or lost wages or other costs of the injury The subrogation
action is one in which the insurer steps into the shoes of the
insured, but in the Blue Cross-tobacco situation, it occupies
only part of the figurative footwear.
Denying punitive awards altogether solves the
apportionment problem by eliminating the need for any
division of the money, but that draconian measure is not the
most just solution. In smokers' individual cases, some juries
have concluded that the tobacco companies' conduct reached
the standards for outrageousness that would support an award
of punitive damages;6 7 the documentary record from the
companies themselves demonstrates appalling misconduct.68
The cost of matching the tobacco defendants' scorched-earth
litigation tactics means that few tobacco victims with
meritorious claims are likely to bring them.69 Class action
litigation is one way of vindicating the rights of the victims.
However, the federal courts have rejected that avenue of
relief,70 and the state courts remain split, so relief of that kind
will be sporadic.7' The policy underlying punitive damages
67 The primary example is the Florida class action judgment, but some
individual suits have also yielded punitive awards. See James Sterngold, A Jury
Awards A Smoker With Lung Cancer $3 Billion From Philip Morris, N.Y. TIMES, June
7, 2001, at A14.
68 See STANTON A. GLANTz ET AL., THE CIGARErTE PAPERS (1996). Additional
documents of interest are found at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/mn_tnal/index.html
(last visited Feb. 9, 2002) and http://www.tobacco.org/Documents/documents.html. (last
visited Feb. 9, 2002). The deposition of Jeffrey S. Wigand, which was dramatized in the
1999 movie The Insider, may be viewed at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu-
/Extra/hotdocs/wiganddepo.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2002).
69 See Weber, supra note 1, at 1009 (discussing high costs of tobacco litigation
and their implications).
70 See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996)
(reversing certification of a nationwide class of nicotine-dependent persons, their
estates, and family members); Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998)
(affirming decertification of class action for medical monitoring of tobacco victims);
Barreras Ruiz v. Am. Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194 (D.P.R. 1998); Arch v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 175 F.R.D. 469 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
71 Compare R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996) (permitting state-wide class action of smokers to go forward) with Small v.
[Vol. 67" 2
TOBACCO LITIGATION RECONSIDERED
supports the availability of some procedural mechamsm for
obtaining the relief in a case where the facts justify it.72 If
insurer litigation is the best-or perhaps the only-mechanism
for obtaining pumtive recoveries, the problems with
apportionment should not be permitted to stand in the way
The courts should allow the claims and adopt either a rule
compelling remittance to the victims (minus an appropriate
deduction for reasonable costs of recovery)73 or a rule calling for
proportional distribution based on the proportion of the costs of
the injury borne by the victim and the insurer.
B. Junsdictin in Common Law Tobacco Subrogatin
Actons
Whether for punitive damages or compensatory reliet
insurer claims that are not appended to a RICO or other
federal claim fall outside federal jurisdiction, in the absence of
complete diversity 74 Diversity may exist in some Blue Cross
cases, though the plaintiffs could fairly easily defeat it by
naming a nondiverse defendant such as a distributor, who
would be liable under product liability and negligence theories,
or an advertiser, who might have entered into a conspiracy to
defraud or violate state consumer protection laws.75
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 720 N.E.2d 892 (1999) (rejecting smokers' consumer fraud class
action). The Florida case resulted in a $144.8 billion punitive damages award that is
now under appeal. See Engle v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 CA-3 (Fla. Cir. Ct.,
Dade County Nov. 6, 2000) (Final Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order), at Tobacco
Control Resource Center & The Tobacco Products Liability Project,
http://tobacco.neu.edulExtra/Engle/kayel-6-00.PDF (last visited Feb. 9, 2002).
72 The policies belnd punitive damages include punishment and retribution,
deterrence, and encouragement to potential plaintiffs to uncover wrongdoing by
providing additional funds to finance litigation. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §
3.11(2)-(3) (2d ed. 1993).
73 A litigant whose actions confer benefits on another is traditionally granted a
reasonable fee out of the benefits conferred. See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticomc Natl Bank,
307 U.S. 161, 163-67 (1939) (explaining basis for fee award).
74 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994) (establishing diversity jurisdiction).
75 See Scott v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. Civ.A.97-1178, 1997 WL 749415 (E.D. La.
Dec. 2, 1997) (remanding case to state court in light of tobacco distributor defendants'
co-citizen status with plaintiffs). See generally Weber, supra note 1, at 1001-05
(discussing federal jurisdiction in tobacco class action suits).
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One court has found that the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act76 ("ERISA") preempts the third party
claims of a multi-employer benefits trust that provided
insurance to tobacco victims, and that therefore any such
claims fall within federal jurisdiction and must be decided
under the interpretations of that statute.77 The court's
reasomng was breathtakingly broad: It would sweep every
subrogation claim by a multi-employer trust against a
tortfeasor into federal court, no matter how small the case or
localized the occurrence. Any auto accident in which the
injuries have been paid for by the plan and the plan sues the
negligent driver becomes a federal case.7 8  The court's
conclusion rests on a comparison between actions by the trust
against the employee-beneficiary (clearly covered by ERISA
and subject to federal jurisdiction) to actions by the trust
against a third party,79 in which the trust merely assumes the
role the beneficiary would otherwise occupy in the state's tort
liability system.
However dubious this comparison is, it does not affect
the Blue Cross plans, which are not multi-employer trusts.
Though the insurance is typically provided as a benefit of
employment, it is not subject to the web of pervasive ERISA
regulation that covers multi-employer trusts. Hence, in the
absence of a RICO claim there is no ground, apart from
diversity, for federal jurisdiction, and if the RICO claims fail,
76 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
77 Lyons, 225 F.3d at 912-14.
78 The court attempts to avoid tis conclusion by distinguishing subrogation
cases brought in the name of the beneficiary. Id. at 913. How a subrogation case is
captioned is a matter of state law, see JERRY, supra note 18, § 96(h), at 620-21, that
does not affect the impact that the litigation has on core ERISA relationships. But see
Lyons, 225 F.3d at 913 (relying on distinction). Scholarly commentary supports a much
more conservative view of ERISA preemption than that espoused by Lyons. E.g.,
Jeffrey W Stempel & Nadia von Magdenko, Doctors, HMOs, ERISA, and the Public
Interest After Pegram v. Herdrich, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 687, 690 (2001); accord James J.
Brudney, The Changing Complexion of Workplace Law: Labor and Employment
Decisions of the Supreme Court's 1999-2000 Term, 16 LAB. LAW. 151, 195 (2000);
Thomas R. McLean & Edward P Richards, Managed Care Liability for Breach of
Piductary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich. The End of ERISA Preemption for State Law
Liability for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2001).
79 See Lyons, 225 F.3d at 913. The opinion does not discuss whether the
benefits trust may maintain an action for subrogation under the federal common law of
ERISA. Although the opinion is somewhat obscure, the plaintiffs apparently did not
pursue that claim. See id. at 911-12.
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the state courts should be able to develop the subrogation,
underlying tort, and procedural principles that will apply to
the Blue Cross cases. 80
III. PRESENTING THE SUBROGATION CLAIM
The conditions on recovery that the subrogation borrows
from its underlying claims bring to the fore the very practical
problems of trying the combined subrogated claims of
thousands (or even millions) of tobacco victims. The Empre
case reached verdict in a reasonable period of time, but the
issues relating to the trial will likely be the source of years of
appeals. Any underlying tobacco case comprises issues of
exposure, reliance on tobacco company representations (and
the subsidiary issues relating to tobacco companies' willful
misconduct and congressional preemption of some warning
claims), the dangers of tobacco products, when those dangers
were known, damages, possible comparative fault, and
additional questions relevant to punitive remedies.
Individual subrogation litigation would be possible in
theory, with the insurance companies presenting smokers'
damages cases seriatim. However, a more attractive
proposition to the plaintiffs, the court system, and perhaps
even the defendants would be a combined trial on the relevant
elements and defenses of the smokers' subrogated claims, with
the nature and amount of the losses proven primarily through
expert opinion and statistical evidence. Moreover, given the
reality of litigation costs and finite judicial time, combined
proceedings conducted in that fashion might be the only cost-
effective way to adjudicate the case at all. Combined
proceedings present the opportunity for litigation against the
tobacco companies by an opponent whose resources and
sophistication present something of an even match.
80 I have argued elsewhere that state courts are the forum of choice for the
development of underlying tort law in mass product exposures and similar dispersed
injury cases. See Mark C. Weber, Forum Allocation in Toxic Tort Cases: Lessons from
the Tobacco Litigation and Other Recent Developments, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'r REV. __ (forthcoming 2002); Weber, supra note 1, at 1014-20; Mark C.
Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical
Advantages of the State Forum Over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215 (1994).
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A. Relevant Elements of Clatms and Defenses
Getting past the long list of potential issues of fact in a
tobacco case premised on product liability, negligence, and
statutory or nonstatutory fraud and misrepresentation, the
question is whether some of these issues may be amenable to
legal approaches that facilitate their proof or disproof in an
aggregate proceeding. Plainly, some matters, such as those
that pertain to tobacco company conduct, are the same or
nearly the same for all the underlying claims. 81 Other
questions of fact, such as reliance by smokers on misleading
information, or a particular smoker's comparative fault with
regard to negligence or product liability,82 would appear to be
less so.
Although the elements of these underlying claims and
defenses may need to be taken as a given in establishing
subrogation liability, the decision of which party has the
obligation to bring forward evidence on them or assume the
risk of nonpersuasion is much more fluid. In many cases, from
Summers v. Tice83 to broad applications of res ipsa loquitur,84
courts have shifted the burden of production or persuasion
from a plaintiff with an apparently just cause but an
evidentiary difficulty to a probable wrongdoer. At times, as
with Summers, the court has shifted the burden when the
defendant cannot establish its defense any more effectively
81 Some underlying claims of smokers with brand loyalties pertain only
to particular defendants. Nevertheless, proof of civil conspiracy, see Adcock v.
Brakegate, Ltd., 645 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 1994), which the insurers have alleged, or various
market share liability approaches, see Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069,
1077-78, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 511-13 (1989), would make the proof of the conduct of every
manufacturer relevant to each claim.
82 Most states now assimilate assumption of risk into comparative negligence
in product liability cases. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcT LIABILITY §
17 cmt. d (1998) (describing majority view).
83 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (leading U.S. case on alternative causation involving
two independent tortfeasors who were each held liable for the whole damage caused to
the plaintiff, despite the fact that only one tortfeasor could have caused the harm).
84 See, e.g., Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1 (Alaska
1978) (permitting jury to find that operator of plane liable in airplane crash m absence
of explanation of cause of crash); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal.
1994) (permitting liability in case in which bottle exploded in plaintiffs hand);
Anderson v. Serv. Merch. Co., 485 N.W.2d 170 (Nev. 1992) (permitting finding of
liability in case in which light fixture fell from ceiling).
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than the plaintiff would have been able to establish the claim
had the burden remained where it was.85
With regard to comparative negligence, shifting the
burden to the tobacco defendants is not a shift at all. Before the
widespread adoption of comparative negligence, the vast
majority of jurisdictions allocated the burdens of pleading,
production, and persuasion on the topic of contributory
negligence to the defendant. Those states that have dealt with
the issue of burdens on comparative negligence have assigned
them to the defendant, and scholarly opimon supports that
view 86Therefore, if the trier of fact cannot make up its mind or
must engage in estimation to determine how much the
subrogation damages should be reduced for the comparative
negligence of the smokers, it seems perfectly appropriate that
the tobacco compames should bear that risk, if indeed they
have marketed a defective product or engaged in negligent,
reckless, or intentionally wrongful activity 87 Even those states
that would otherwise allocate the burden to the plaintiff would
do well to shift it to the wrongdoer in a mass subrogation
action of the kind being brought by the Blue Cross plans.
The issue of reliance in fraud and misrepresentation
claims (either common law or RICO) may also be amenable to
judicial burden shifting. Courts have frequently accepted
conclusive or rebuttable presumptions of reliance in consumer
fraud cases.88 In securities fraud class actions, the Supreme
85 Summers, 199 P.2d at 4 (acknowledging effect of shifting burden of proof).
86 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 17-2, at 356 nn.17-20
(3d ed. 1994).
87 This description does not fully capture the problem in a modified
comparative negligence state, for if the responsibility assigned to the victim equals (or
in other states is greater than) 50%, the reduction is 100%. Nevertheless, establishing
the percentages that pertain to the smokers and applying the appropriate rule is no
easier for the plaintiff than for the defendant. Moreover, the temptation to assign the
smoker a percentage of fault equal or greater than 50% diminishes if the trier of fact
considers the reality that most smokers become addicted at about age fourteen and
that mcotine is an extremely difficult drug to quit. See Richard L. Cupp., Jr., A
Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and Consumer Choice in "Third
Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465, 485, 499-506 (1998) (providing
information about mcotine addiction and discussing its impact on assignment of fault
to smokers). As indicated below, expert opinion and statistical support would be the
most sensible way to approach the issue whether the burdens fall on the plaintiff or the
defendant.
88 See, e.g., Cope v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 696 N.E.2d 1001, 1008 (Ohio 1998)
(allowing inference of reliance by entire class regarding marketing of insurance
policies); Stellema v. Vantage Press, Inc., 109 A.D.2d 423, 425-26, 492 N.Y.S.2d 390,
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Court has permitted the use of a "fraud-on-the-market" theory
that dispenses with the need for individual proof of reliance on
the assumption that false information affects the prices of the
security whether the individual investor relies on it or not.8 9
The analogy between smoking and the consumer class actions
is closer than that for the securities law, but even the
securities situation demonstrates the flexibility of the
assignment of burdens, the need to respond to the fact of what
realistically can be proved, and the urgency of vindicating
social policies against fraud and deceit.90
B. Use of Statistical Evidence
At the outset, the Empire plaintiffs announced their
intention to rely on statistical evidence and expert opinion in
proving their direct injury and subrogation claims, and Judge
Weinstein commented at length on his belief that use of that
approach satisfies due process and jury trial entitlements.91 I
have discussed elsewhere the due process and related issues in
the conduct of mass tort trials, 92 and would merely emphasize
here that a subrogation action of the Blue Cross type is a far
more appropriate candidate for mass trial techniques, such as
statistical inference, than is a class action product liability
case. The participation concerns of the individual claimants
393 (Ist Dep't 1985) (noting that reliance could be presumed in class action regarding
publication contracts). Reliance is not necessarily an element in state consumer fraud
statutory actions, see Group Health Plan, 621 N.W.2d at 13; Stutman v. Chemical
Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608, 612 (N.Y. 2000), though something akin to it may need to be
shown to establish causation, see Group Health Plan, Inc., 621 N.W.2d at 13-14.
8 9 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
90 See generally Hal S. Scott, Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule
10b-5, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 337, 348-71 (1971) (discussing relationship between nature
and use of class action device and development of fraud-on-the-market reasoning in
lower courts).
91 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, 113 F Supp. 2d at 372-76.
The court extended the analysis to state law objections to proof of the state law claims
by the same means. Id. at 379-80. The Empire opinion makes the same points about
due process and jury trial, though it focuses on state law consumer fraud claims
supporting the $17 million verdict. Empire, 2001 WL 1304370, at *46-*52.
92 See Weber, supra note 1, at 1011-14; Mark C. Weber, Mass Jury Trals in
Mass Tort Cases: Some Preliminary Issues, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 473 (1998); cf.
Mark C. Weber, Managing Complex Litigation in the Illinois Courts, 27 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 959, 973-74 (1996) (discussing procedural mechanisms used in Illinois).
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either are nonexistent, may be deemed satisfied by the
contractual subrogation provision, or may be met by limited
intervention in the trial proceedings. 93 The concern of
defendants for an accurate determination is more clearly met
in a mass determination made with sophisticated statistical
tools than even in individual litigation.94 Discussing the
tobacco companies' proportional responsibility for the cost of
treating conditions such as lung cancer, heart disease, and
other maladies, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
commented that "[s]tatistical methods could provide a decent
answer-likely a more accurate answer than is possible when
addressing the equivalent causation question in a single
person's suit. 9 5
C. Economies of Scale and Magnitude of Recovery
A power imbalance affects smokers' actions against the
tobacco companies because the tobacco defendants can mass
resources against individual plaintiffs. Of course, the tobacco
industry has a legal right to defend itself as vigorously as it
can afford to do, which is very vigorously indeed. But a party
that takes advantage of its litigation power can hardly
complain when a new opponent adopts its own tactics. That is
what the insurers have done. The Blue Cross plans are large
enterprises with the ability to finance protracted litigation,
even if their resources still do not quite match those of the
tobacco defendants. The Blue Cross plans have combined their
purses and taken advantage of economies of scale in litigating
9 3 See generally Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases A
Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L REV. 69, 74-76, 82-86 (explaining participation concerns of
claimants in mass tort proceedings).
94 See Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The
Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44
STAN. L. REV. 815, 825-26 (1992) (discussing benefits of use of statistical inference in
mass tort cases); cf Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 787 (9th Cir. 1996)
(approving use of statistical methods of proof in class action over human rights
violations).
95 Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 196 F.3d at 823. A subrogation action, which relies on
this measure of damages, is thus a much easier action to sustain than the direct injury
action that the court rejected on the ground that the ultimate gain or loss to the
insurer itself is nonexistent or impossible to measure. Cf id. at 824-27 (asserting that
gain or loss from smoking diseases to medical intermediaries is indeterminate or does
not occur).
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the cases. Empire's success on its subrogation claim shows
what sophisticated legal advocacy can accomplish. If the
Empire subrogation verdict withstands appeal (even if the
direct injury claim fails) and other Blue Cross companies
succeed, perhaps with still larger awards, the aggregated
recoveries may even threaten the profitability of Big Tobacco. 96
The tobacco companies' reaction to the rare victories of
individual smokers is revealing. After the award of $3 billion in
an individual smoker's suit this June,97 a stock analyst
downplayed the sigmficance of the verdict, predicting it would
be overturned on appeal.98 The analyst noted, however, that
the industry is worried about aggregate cases, such as those
filed as class actions or by third parties. "Tobacco companies
won seven cases in a row before this one," the New York Times
quoted the analyst. "The real challenge, in our opinion, are the
aggregate suits."99 Aggregated subrogation actions provide the
opportunity for a fair fight between a powerful representative
of those injured by tobacco and powerful companies that clm
that the responsibility is not theirs.
CONCLUSION
Subrogation claims by health care insurers against Big
Tobacco deserve the serious attention of the litigants, the
courts, and those of us who comment from the sidelines. The
claims are the logical outgrowth of the effort to recover for the
losses inflicted by tobacco, and may be squared, though not
without some challenges, with RICO and state law principles.
If they prove successful, subrogation claims will present still
more questions for courts and scholars about the measure of
recovery and allocation of proceeds.
96 See Weber, supra note 1, at 1009-14 (describing effect of aggregate tobacco
litigation in balancing plaintiff and defendant resources and bringing all claims to the
head of the trial queue).
97 See Sterngold, supra note 67, at A14; see also http://www.foxnews.com/-
story/0,2933,26611,00.html; http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/june0l,2001-06-06-
smoke.htm.
98 See Sterngold, supra note 67.
9 9 Id.
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